

EMERGING WORLD ORDER AND THE ROLE OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA

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ABSTRACT

Regional Integration, National Security, Democracy Glue

In a marked departure from India's status-quo foreign policy which ran unchanged for decades, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's early moves indicate a change is in the air. His invitation to eight heads of state in the immediate neighborhood to his swearing-in ceremony was an unprecedented move – a sign perhaps that under the leadership of the new prime minister, India will pro-actively engage with the rest of world.

The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner that locates India's global strategic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvas that is not just limited to political diplomacy, but also includes our economic, scientific, cultural, political and security interests, both regional and global, on the principles of equality and mutuality, so that it leads to an economically stronger India, and its voice is heard in the international fora.

In terms of geography, India's foreign policy has always regarded the concept of neighborhood as one of widening concentric circles, around a central axis of historical and cultural commonalities. From this point of view, it has always given due priority to the development of relations with the countries of Asia. In South Asia, India has been driven by the vision of encouraging regional integration to bring about peace and prosperity for the more than one and a half billion people living in this region. We understand very well, that we cannot be insulated from our neighborhood; our growth and prosperity has a beneficial impact on the rest of the region, and increasingly, we will have to build closer connectivity's in trade, communications and other networks of interaction between ourselves and our neighbors. We have tried to reconnect and reach out in the civilizational space we share with our near neighbors in Southeast Asia since the early 1990s. The major determinants of the foreign policy of any nation are its national security interests and its economic interests. Foreign policies of nations do not function in a vacuum insulated by delusional moral and ideological obsessions. Foreign policies perforce, have to take into account the prevailing regional and international strategic realities with which a nation has to strike workable equations based on one's own existing power attributes and strategic utility to the key global powers. However, his natural playfield for democracy promotion will be in South Asia. Modi's conviction that the "democracy glue" will eventually bind South Asia together serves the cause of democracy promotion well.

KEYWORDS: Global Strategic Engagement, Neighborhood

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the twentieth century, the list of the world's great powers was predictably short: the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and northwestern Europe. The twenty-first century will be different. China and India are emerging as economic and political heavyweights: China holds over a trillion dollars in hard currency reserves, India's high-tech sector

is growing by leaps and bounds, and both countries, already recognized nuclear powers, are developing blue-water navies. The National Intelligence Council, a U. S. government think tank, projects that by 2025, China and India will have the world's second- and fourth-largest economies, respectively. Such growth is opening the way for a multipolar era in world politics.

The cold war era collapsed in 1989. The division of Europe had been overcome symbolically with the collapse of the Berlin wall and literally with the progressive opening of borders between Hungary and Austria, East Germany and West Germany. Undoubtedly, this symbolized a change of mood of nations. Meanwhile the relative decline in US economic power, the rising pressure of budget and trade deficits and the apparently declining soviet military threat made defense cost and the “superpower” responsibilities of the. The structures through which international affairs have been conducted for the last forty years had been shaken to their basics. **First** these momentous and unanticipated changes not only liberated Eastern Europe but the US and the Western Europe, too, from the constraints of the sustained military preparedness imposed and rationalized by the cold war. **Second** The post second world order was defined, by partition. Its most striking manifestation was Germany. **Third**, the order was defined by stability. **Forth**, stability, however, was not matched by legitimacy. **Fifth**, the European order was marked by dependence of the less or on the greater actors. Theoretically, the Europeans were free to do as they pleased, but in practice, the west Europeans had borne the burdens of alliance rather than face the rigorous of neutrality. It was also due to three factors: a world politics simplified into a game for two players; the Yalta agreement, which in practice demarcated each superpower's zone of influence from which neither tried to break out; and eventually, the unquestionable prosperity and stability of the developed capitalist countries which eliminated the possibility, let alone the likelihood, of social revolution in that region outside Europe. The world in twenty first century is remarkably different from the cold war period. The end of ideological clash and strategic competition between the superpowers, which had tremendous role in accentuating conflicts across the world generated new hope for building a peaceful and cooperative world order. New conflicts and issues have surfaced in the form of ethnic conflicts, refugee problem, environmental degradation, terrorism; etc.

In twenty-first century, foreign policy of India is going to be very different from what it was when country became independent. Not surprisingly, India's post-independence policymakers were acutely sensitive to the significance of this colonial legacy. Accordingly, they explicitly sought to forge a pathway that would keep India outside the ambit of the Cold War. Such a strategy was possible because anti-imperialist sentiments were widespread within the Indian polity across the political spectrum. This strategy came to be known as non-alignment and Indian policymakers were at pains to distinguish it from “neutrality”. When India became free the world scenario was quite changed. It was the time of cold war; world politics was divided in two blocs; the first one was led by USA under the capitalist ideology and another was by USSR under the communist ideology. India, under Nehru, did not wish to become a part of any bloc and adopted a new policy, which is known as non-alignment policy. Non-alignment has been regarded as the most important feature of India's foreign policy. Non alignment aimed at maintaining national independence in foreign affairs by not joining any military alliance formed by the USA and USSR in the aftermath of the Second World War. Nonalignment was neither neutrality nor non-involvement nor isolationism. It was a dynamic concept which meant not commitment to any military bloc but taking an independent stand on international issues according to the merits of each case. Under this policy India had chosen an independent path for foreign policy and became a natural leader of newly independent Afro-Asian countries in the surcharged atmosphere of cold war bloc politics between USA and USSR. Changes which took place in 1989-91 were clearly looking at the global level. Economic liberalization became compulsion rather than necessity for India. In context

of foreign policy, the major challenge for India, to list out the new subjects according to new world circumstances because those subjects which were key determinant to India's foreign policy in post independent period, became irrelevant after the end of cold war.

ROLE OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Where is India's foreign policy headed in the post-Cold War era? Obviously the structure of the international system has changed beyond recognition since the immediate post-war era. Will India be able to sustain the pragmatic approach to the conduct of its foreign policy without completely sacrificing the values that it cherishes and protects at home? This paper will answer these questions on three levels:

- Post-Cold war
- Post -Nuclear Period
- Less- Nuclear Period

INDIA ON THE OTHER HAND WANTS

- Recognition as a responsible nuclear weapons state
- Access to fissile material and latest nuclear technology
- US support with regard to Pakistan and the China-Pakistan nexus (Asian balance of power)
- Maintain its sovereignty in all aspects of domestic and foreign policy formulation.

POST-COLD WAR

In post-cold war period India adopt realistic aim and objective based, result oriented and positive foreign policy. India's economic liberalization, initiated in the early 1990s, allowed it to build its new foreign policy on the thrusts of economic diplomacy. There were so many challenges came in the way of policy makers in terms of foreign policy. The challenges included balancing the relations with global powers, building a new partnership with regional organization, expanding the influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, making NAM more relevant according to new conditions, enhance India's economic and energy security, to deal with environmental and human security threats, UN reforms and permanent membership of Security Council and active pursuit for multipolar world. In the post-Cold War era, among the most notable groupings are NAFTA, EU, and ASEAN.

India engaged new friends, maintained steadfast contact with old friends, and an ever watchful eye over enemies. India started its journey of economic liberalization, and the Gujral doctrine dampened hegemonic fears among neighbors. India extended its influence into the distant neighborhoods of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. India established economic and diplomatic relations with Israel and deepened ties with the Arab states. India's economic engagement of ASEAN continued at a steadfast rate throughout the 1990's. Relations with the US gradually thawed and even blossomed. Relations with Russia continued to mature and involved a long standing multidimensional approach involving security, military, and economic links. India's engagement of Southeast Asia was dubbed as "Look East policy." Southeast Asia ties while improving security in the Northeast region and paving the way for future economic development. Something that India had previously ignored. India's economic engagement of ASEAN continued at a steadfast rate throughout the 1990's

and reaped dividends in the form of trade agreements, increased contact between people, and the establishment of sub-regional grouping such as BIMSTEC (Bangladesh India Myanmar Sri Lanka Thailand Economic Council) and GMC (Ganga Mekong Cooperative). These groups worked towards free trade agreements, common development of infrastructure, and integration of national economies into the global economy. India's engagement of Myanmar despite significant Indo – Myanmar ties formed the first and critical step in India. Nonetheless, one must note several significant points of convergence such as economic development, balance of power in Asia, stemming of terrorism and policy with regard to Afghanistan. Stability in Afghanistan forms the pivot of India's political, economic and strategic policy in Central Asia. Any constraints on Indian policy in the region will ease the path of fundamentalist influence.

POST -NUCLEAR PERIOD

In a stunning move India carried out three nuclear tests on May 11, 1998. As the Clinton administration preached nuclear morality, India retorted with an additional 2 tests on May 13, 1998. India “gate crashed” into the exclusive nuclear club. Despite bravado about a de-nuclearizing India from a nonproliferation regime in Washington the world accepted India as a nuclear reality. India voluntarily agreed to the principle of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) as a way of calming American apprehensions. This issue, of course, put the two sides on a collision course as India was a staunch opponent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and categorically refused to accede to its expectations. Over the last several decades, India has emphasized nuclear disarmament rather than nuclear non-proliferation. On the one hand, India always saw such spread of nuclear weapons as a danger. In addition to focusing on nuclear disarmament and non-compliance by NWS (Nuclear Weapon States), India will also have to come up with meaningful and effective ways of dealing with non-compliance by NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States). One of the disadvantages that India faces in making this policy transition is that India is not a member of the NPT and it is unlikely to become one unless India's de facto NWS status is accepted as de jure status by the NPT members. This is unlikely. But the alternative India giving up its nuclear weapons and joining the treaty as a NNWS is equally unlikely. In essence, then, India's relationship with the treaty is unlikely to undergo any formal changes though India can be expected to play a more active diplomatic role in trying to keep the NPT system together.

Modi has tried to dispel the misgivings in the international community regarding the nuclear doctrine that will bind his government's policies. The topic is important for the audience in Japan and Australia (as well as the US). To quote Modi, there has been “significant progress” in India's negotiations with Japan. Keeping these compulsions in view, Modi presented India's impeccable credentials as a nuclear ‘non-proliferator’. He stressed that continuity rather than change is to be expected in India's nuclear doctrine, since “there is a tradition [in India] of national consensus and continuity on such issues.” Modi specifically ruled out any going back on India's “unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing”, holding out an assurance that should assuage Japanese concerns over India's refusal to sign the CTBT. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's policies on nuclear energy are a major template in the dialectics whether Tokyo can speed up the signing of the nuclear agreement with India during Modi's visit. Equally, the Obama administration has practically taken its eyes off the question of India's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other technology control regimes and Modi's remarks restating India's nuclear doctrine may not make any difference to that ground reality.

LESS- NUCLEAR PERIOD

While a nuclear weapon free world is a long cherished dream nourished by many, the term “Global Zero” is

relatively new and is an international initiative launched in December 2008 to promote the elimination of nuclear weapons. They proclaim that in a phased manner it is possible to destroy all nuclear devices held by official/unofficial nuclear states. They target 2030 as the year by which proportionate dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals to zero is possible.

The process is political and is evolving on three dimensions:

- The nation state (including domestic institutional players).
- The international diplomatic community (encompassing not just blocs of states like the “North”, the “South” or the Non-aligned Movement but also cross-cutting coalitions like the New Agenda Coalition, which had a significant impact at the 2000 NPT Review Conference).
- Civil society (including both national and international networks like ICAN, Global Zero, and many others).

The other two approaches to disarmament and non-proliferation are:

- **Idealistic:** They are those that want the entire idea be accepted universally but it has become difficult to articulate a time-bound executable program. The main thesis of this group is that “a position of deep reductions in nuclear weapons must first be achieved ” from which abolition can be “envisaged, mapped and navigated”, conditions for the same must first be created. However, it neither puts any precision on these conditions nor outlines the “exact shape and detailed content” of what should constitute the starting point.
- **Pragmatic:** They advocate a direct, bold and time –bound program that calls for action by both the NWS as well as the NNWS seeks to achieve nuclear disarmament not by a series of incremental moves but in a time-frame, through a multilaterally negotiated, universal, non-discriminatory and internationally and effectively verifiable convention or treaty. The initiative commenced by Global Zero envisages such an approach.

INDIA AND UNO

The founding fathers of the **United Nations** established the organization with the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, of developing friendly relations among nations and of taking other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace. India one of among the founding fathers of UN. The UN has become the most universal international organization in the world, embracing under its aegis the activities of governments from 184 states (at present 192 states. Since 1945 to present days, years to pass, but there is no any structural change taking place in UN. When it was came in existence five nations were permanent member of Security Council out of fifty one members of UN, and those five nations are still permanent member of Security Council while the number of member nations reached 192. UN, also, not works like an independent international organization. There are so many examples which are proofing that this organization becomes a pocket organization of US. It's a challenge to nations that UN can work as an independent organization. India made an effort to do so. Organizational and institutional restructuring and reform of the UN is core objective of India's foreign policy in 21st century. India convince to other countries including P5 nations since post-cold war period for decentralization and democratization of UN. Another challenge to India's foreign policy, that is to achieve the permanent membership in UN Security Council. India formed a group with Germany, Japan and Brazil called G-4, who were equally strong contenders for permanent membership of the Council and vociferously campaigned for more representation to developing countries.

Modi's speech covered international issues like terrorism, UN Security Council reform, global development, climate change, the Pakistan question in India's foreign policy and India's neighborhood. Modi called for UN Security Council reforms in the coming years, particularly in light of the post-2015 development agenda. Modi's call for a world without the various 'G' groups like G7, G4 and G77 and emphasis on 'G-All' resonates well in the UN.

DIMENSIONS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The major determinants of the foreign policy of any nation are its national security interests and its economic interests. Foreign policies of nations do not function in a vacuum insulated by delusional moral and ideological obsessions. India's foreign policy evolved as a "dual" pattern, encompassing a global as well as a regional role. The two roles were run on a very different basis, as relations with India's neighbors were conducted on a much more realistic policy course as opposed to the moralistic international policy. The regional dimension was based on the fact that India was the hegemon in the region and would do everything to remain so.

Such core concepts as "the national interest" are not defined solely by the international system, much less by its structure alone, but they are also likely to reflect elements within the domestic political arena. The twenty-first century promises to be different. China and India are emerging as economic and political heavyweights: China holds over a trillion dollars in hard currency reserves, India's information technology sector is growing by leaps and bounds, and both countries, already recognized nuclear powers, are developing blue-water navies. Further, the BRIC countries are also on the threshold of a major economic advancement. By the 1990s, India, which always saw itself as the pre-eminent power in South Asia, found its relations with the smaller neighbors had reached a dead end. Recognizing the need to transform its South Asian policy, India embarked on a series of policy innovations that demanded greater generosity and a willingness to walk more than half the distance in resolving its many accumulated problems with smaller neighbors. We understand very well, that we cannot be insulated from our neighborhood; our growth and prosperity has a beneficial impact on the rest of the region, and increasingly, we will have to build closer connectivity's in trade, communications and other networks of interaction between ourselves and our neighbors. The 1990s saw India making a determined effort to reconnect with its extended neighborhood in South East Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia, and the Middle East. India's renewed engagement with the surrounding regions is within a new framework that emphasized economic relations and energy diplomacy rather than the traditional notion of third world solidarity through the nonaligned movement. India is now an active participant in various regional organizations from the East Asia Summit to the African Union. Our primary focus should be on our South Asian neighborhood particularly on the instability emanating from the violence in Bangladesh and Afghanistan. We, along with a number of our SAARC neighbors, will see new leadership emerge; India's attention must stay on these new players, internal and external. We must also be seen as a credible leader in multilateral fora, be it in the Indian Ocean Rim, SAARC or BRICS. All this must be performed within our capabilities but without compromising on pressing domestic issues such as poverty alleviation or reviving economic growth. The consequences of the election of a Modi government for the Australia-India relationship are not yet clear, but there are reasons to think that it will be a positive development. It is widely expected that Modi's pro-business views and relative economic liberalism (at least domestically) will help revive India's economy, which would be **good news for Australia's exports**. This may be good news for the prospects for the finalization of an Australia-India **Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement**.

A new era in regional relations? SAARC leaders attending India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi's swearing-in on 26 May 2014. Modi's goal of a strong India engaging in a global, holistic foreign policy has the potential to rewrite

international relations. It will not be easy. Systems do not like change but, for now, all eyes are on New Delhi. Modi spoke on India's relations with Pakistan, China and the US and on India's nuclear doctrine and the 'Look East' policies. Within Asia, primary growth partners will be China and Japan, and to a lesser degree old partner Russia. That may appear contradictory to some, but in the complex calculus of Asia, countries are not as bound by the zero-sum game '*you are with us or against us*' policies.

CONCLUSIONS

Since 1991, India has moved from its traditional emphasis on the "power of the argument" to a new stress on the "argument of power". Given its noisy democracy, India cannot build domestic political support to foreign policy initiatives purely on the argument of power. It would continue to need a set of values and norms to justify its actions on the world stage. As a consequence the tension between "power and principle" would remain an enduring one in India's foreign policy strategy. **First** increased power potential will mean that India would have to take positions on major international issues and regional conflicts. In other words, India would have to often find ways to limit the pursuit of "national interest" in order to contribute to "collective interests" of the international system.

Second as India emerges as an important element of future balance of power in the world, it would be pressed to make choices in favor of one or the other great powers at least on specific issues. The absence of great power confrontation in the last few years has allowed India the luxury of converting the slogan of "non-alignment" into an "independent" foreign policy. But amidst potential new rivalries among the U. S., China, Europe, Russia, and Japan, **Third**, the demands on India to contribute to order and stability in its immediate and extended neighborhood would dramatically increase in the coming decades. **Finally**, India, like other great powers before it, is also in the danger of falling a victim to ultra-nationalism and an over-determination of national interest. Tempering nationalism and balancing ends and means are two challenges that come inseparably with a rising power potential on the world stage.

The United States could get something in return for accommodating these states in institutions such as the UN and the IMF and giving them the recognition and prestige they demand: a commitment by Beijing and New Delhi that they will accept the key rules of the global game. The United States faces a challenging road ahead. European countries remain vital allies. On issues such as human rights and democracy promotion, Europe speaks with a powerful, constructive voice. Bringing China and India into the concert of great powers without alienating the EU or its members will require prodigious amounts of diplomatic will and skill.

In a marked departure from India's status-quo foreign policy which ran unchanged for decades, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's early moves indicate a change is in the air. His invitation to eight heads of state in the immediate neighborhood to his swearing-in ceremony was an unprecedented move – a sign perhaps that under the leadership of the new prime minister, India will pro-actively engage with the rest of world. The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner that locates India's global strategic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvas that is not just limited to political diplomacy, but also includes our economic, scientific, cultural, political and security interests, both regional and global, on the principles of equality and mutuality, so that it leads to an economically stronger India, and its voice is heard in the international fora. Foreign policies perforce, have to take into account the prevailing regional and international strategic realities with which a nation has to strike workable equations based on one's own existing power attributes and strategic utility to the key global powers.

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